





Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are state-owned investment funds composed 
of financial assets such as stocks, bonds, property, precious metals or other 
financial instruments. SWFs invest globally and most of them are funded 
by foreign exchange assets. They may have their origin in commodities (created 
through commodity exports, either taxed or owned by the government) 
or assets transferred from official foreign exchange reserves.
SWFs have been present in the financial world since 1953, when the first 
of them, the Kuwait Investment Board, was set up. Nevertheless their rapid 
development and growth of prominence is a rather new phenomena. Their 
growing position in the world, in terms of asset value as well as number of funds, 
has been observed in the world since 2005.
Although there has been vivid academic debate as to what extent SWFs 
are motivated by political reasons (this topic is addressed in Chapter 2), 
it is rather clear that countries can use state-owned investment funds as a tool 
of their foreign policy. Such danger was addressed by the IMF and its Santiago 
Principles (the document that set out the common standards regarding 
transparency, independence, and governance of SWFs), noticed also by the EU 
as well as various academics and experts.
Therefore, in our study we made an assumption that SWFs are instruments 
of state policy, serving to their national interest. This is very much in line 
with realism, one of the most prominent theories of international relations, 
that focuses the attention of scholars on the concept of power and the notion 
that states pursue policies that maximize their power through various means. SWFs 
in this context are perceived as instruments of economic statecraft (see: Chapter 2).
The complementary theoretical approach focuses on the state and its role 
as an independent economic agent. As rational economic agents, states seek 
the best possible ways to maximize their wealth, they try to take advantage 
of available opportunities and invest their funds where the highest expected 
return can be found. Looking through this prism then we come to find 
that investor states employ their SWFs for commercial purposes, with special 
emphasis on the management of national wealth.
There are also other explanations for the behavior of SWFs (see: Chapter 2), 
but those two are the most important to conceptualize our theoretical approach. 
We would like also stress that taking into account the dynamic nature of SWFs 
and multiplicity of their goals, any single theoretical perspective would be 
inadequate to explain their behavior.
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This book looks at SWF activities in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). 
Since entering the European Union (EU) in 2004 the investment attractiveness 
of Poland and other countries in CEE has grown. Consequently, foreign investors 
have become increasingly interested in investing in the region than before. 
As such, it should not be surprising that, SWFs have also begunfinancial activities 
in CEE.
The main goal of this book is to determine the main motives for SWF 
presence in CEE. Are the potential financial gains the only reason behind 
their investments? Are SWF activities in the region dangerous for the stability 
and security of the CEE countries?
Our hypothesis was that SWF investments in CEE are not only financially 
driven, with the political motives of their investors, wishing to see reached, also 
being a factor. This could create potential security threats for Poland and other 
countries in the region.
Answering the abovementioned questions contributes to the academic 
discussion about SWF strategies and deeper understanding of the motives 
behind SWF operation. It is also part of the debate about security risks linked 
with the growth of global investment activities by states. We hope that this 
interdisciplinary work will contribute to two fields: political science (notably 
international relations) and economics (investment management). In particular, 
the following aspects will be dealt with:
Political science:
1. A better understanding of SWFs as a policy tool used by states in the era 
of globalization.
2. An insight into the mechanisms of foreign policy used by the global 
economic powers. The book will help understand the strategies, goals 
and foreign policy agendas of these countries.
Economics:
1. A review of SWF investment strategies, in particular regarding the balance 
between investment efficiency and the pursuit of political objectives.
2. Formulation of socioeconomic conclusions in the context of attracting SWFs 
whose investment strategies are perceived (by the host countries) as desirable 
and mitigating the outcomes of SWF investment and non-investment 
engagement, potentially detrimental to the interests of the CEE countries.
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Given the qualitative and quantitative character of the research, 
the methodology will draw on both approaches. In essence, the methodology 
will enable a thorough and empirical-based testing of the primary research 
proposition as to the existence and significance of non-investment objectives 
in the activity of global SWFs operational in the selected CEE economies 
of: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland 
and Slovakia.
In our research we covered seven EU member states. Originally we planned 
also to analyze two other CEE countries: Ukraine and Belarus. However, 
it turned out that those countries have not attracted any SWFs investments.
This research study is based on empirical data gleaned from the Sovereign 
Wealth Fund Institute Transaction Database – arguably the most comprehensive 
and authoritative resource tracking SWF investment behavior globally. 
In the database (till mid 2014) 11,633 SWF transactions were catalogued, 
including 1,118 domestic investments with a value USD 174.1 billion and 10,515 
foreign investments with a value of USD 675.8 billion. Therefore, about 90% 
of the number of SWF investments and about 80% of the total value of SWF 
deals are cross-border transactions. Combining this database with additional 
media sources we selected 47 transaction in CEE, valued at USD 8.274 billion. 
The full list of transactions is presented in Annex 9.
Certainly, the outcome does not pretend to be fully comprehensive 
of all SWF activities in the region. SWFs are widely perceived as relatively 
opaque even among alternative investment managers. Due to this fact 
their investment activity is commensurately obscure. SWFs often operate 
through special purpose vehicles (SPVs), which complicates identification 
of their beneficial ownership or accurate and timely portfolio compositions. 
Moreover, the majority of sovereign wealth funds are notorious for inferior 
standards of transparency measured via the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency 
Index. Suffice it to say that only 4 out of the 12 biggest SWFs, managing 
80% of total SWF assets, scored more than 6 out of a maximum of 10 
points and can be perceived as relatively transparent. However, considering 
the aforementioned constraints and inevitable simplifications, it can be 
claimed that we managed to collect a sufficient probe to enable the postulation 
of academic conclusions.
Our research activities presented in the book were limited by a number 
of practical factors, such as:
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• relative opacity: SWFs, as  (largely) unregulated institutional investors 
do not offer lofty standards of institutional transparency, which is likely 
to complicate an in-depth and comprehensive analysis;
• limited history: SWFs are a relatively novel form of alternative investment 
management: this by  definition limits the  time horizon of  empirical 
research and the scope for far-reaching systemic conclusions and policy 
recommendations;
• uniqueness: every SWF pursues its own strategy (a function of the political 
agenda set by  its creators/contributors); due to  the  variations in  SWF 
activity any aggregate conclusion could be precarious.
The book is a result of the research project “The Political Impact 
of Investments of Sovereign Wealth Funds in Central and Eastern Europe 
Political” financed by the (Polish) National Science Centre (Decision no. DEC-
2012/07/B/HS5/03797). The project was implemented in the years 2013–2015 
by a team of researchers engaged by the Faculty of International and Political 
Studies at the University of Łódź.
The team of authors involved on the creation of this book is composed 
of three political scientists and two economists of diverse ages and academic 
backgrounds. This makes a persuasive case for a well-rounded and balanced 
piece of research (between political science and economics) and will enable 
a comprehensive approach to the study.
The book is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 presents the SWFs 
from the economic point of view. It encapsulates the most recent findings 
on SWF investment activity globally. The author discusses the position 
of global SWFs among conventional and alternative asset managers, 
SWF allocation strategies, their recent investment behavior and its likely 
evolution in the foreseeable future. Chapter 2 conceptualizes the political 
significance of SWFs. The analysis starts from the concept of economic 
statecraft, its instruments and position of SWFs in this context. Then a review 
of the academic discussion concerning motives behind SWF activities 
is presented, with a central question about the importance of political ones 
being addressed. Finally, the list of risks that should be taken into account 
as long as SWF investments in the CEE are concerned are outlined. Chapter 
3 looks at the problem of the global competitiveness of CEE financial markets. 
The assessment is made using quantitative and hybrid metrics of financial center 
development while placing particular emphasis on competitiveness drivers 
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relevant to the activity of global SWFs in the CEE region. Chapter 4 offers 
an overview of SWF investments in CEE. This chapter also aims to inquire 
into the possible reasons for the relatively low investments by presenting them 
and analyzing their specificity.
The case study section starts from Chapter 5 that looks at the role of SWFs 
in China’s policy toward CEE. Despite a visible growth of economic ties, Beijing 
presented a very limited will to use investments as a political instrument 
in the region. Chapter 6 presents the picture of portfolio and political 
implications of Norway’s SWF investments in CEE. However, seeing 
as the Norwegian fund is the most transparent one, it is also probably the most 
politically biased. The final chapter gives insight into Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) countries, which invest in CEE through their SWFs. It analyzes the main 
directions of these investments, political and economic interests behind them 
and finally concludes with the political risks analyses. A summary of all these 
findings and comparative analyses of all three cases studies are presented 
in the concluding section, at the end.
